

P6_TA-PROV(2007)0032

Transportation and illegal detention of prisoners

European Parliament resolution on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners (2006/2200(INI))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2005 on the presumed use of European countries for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners by the CIA¹,
- having regard to its decision of 18 January 2006 setting up a Temporary Committee on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners²,
- having regard to its resolution of 6 July 2006 on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners, adopted midway through the work of the Temporary Committee³,
- having regard to the delegations which the Temporary Committee sent to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Romania, Poland and Portugal,
- having regard to the hearings, numbering no fewer than 130, held by the Temporary Committee in the course of its meetings, delegation missions and confidential interviews,
- having regard to all the written contributions received by the Temporary Committee or to which it has had access, particularly the confidential documents forwarded to it, notably by the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol) and the German Government, or which it has obtained from various sources,
- having regard to its resolution of 30 November 2006 on the progress made in the EU towards the Area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) (Articles 2 and 39 of the EU Treaty)⁴, notably its paragraph 3,
- having regard to its resolution of 13 June 2006 on the situation of prisoners at Guantánamo⁵,
- having regard to Rule 175 of its Rules of Procedure,
- having regard to the report of the Temporary Committee on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners (A6-0020/2007),

¹ OJ C 286 E, 23.11.2006, p. 509.

² OJ C 287 E, 24.11.2006, p. 159.

³ *Texts Adopted*, P6_TA(2006)0316.

⁴ *Texts Adopted*, P6_TA-PROV(2006)0525.

⁵ *Texts Adopted*, P6_TA(2006)0254.

- A. whereas, in its resolution of 6 July 2006, Parliament decided that the Temporary Committee would 'continue its work for the remainder of its established twelve-month term, without prejudice to the provisions of Rule 175 of its Rules of Procedure on the possibility of extending the term',
- B. whereas, in adopting its resolution of 22 November 1990 on the Gladio affair¹, Parliament drew attention, more than 16 years ago, to the existence of clandestine operations involving intelligence services and military organisations without adequate democratic control,
- C. whereas the Member States cannot circumvent the requirements imposed on them by Community and international law by allowing other countries' intelligence services, which are subject to less stringent legal provisions, to operate on their territory; whereas, in addition, the operations of intelligence services are consistent with fundamental rights only if adequate arrangements exist for monitoring them,
- D. whereas the principle of the inviolability of human dignity is enshrined in international human rights law, notably in the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the preamble to and Article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and whereas that principle is guaranteed by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights; whereas that principle is reiterated in most Member States' constitutions, as well as in Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union² and whereas that principle should not be undermined, even for the purposes of security, in times of peace or war,
- E. whereas the principle of inviolability of human dignity underlies every other fundamental right guaranteed by international, European and national human rights instruments, in particular the right to life, the right to freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the right to liberty and security, the right to protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition and the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial,
- F. whereas extraordinary rendition and secret detention involve numerous violations of human rights, in particular violations of the right to liberty and security, the freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, the right to an effective remedy, and, in extreme cases, the right to life; whereas, in some cases, where rendition leads to secret detention, it constitutes enforced disappearance,
- G. whereas the prohibition of torture is a peremptory norm of international law (*jus cogens*) from which no derogation is possible and the obligation to protect against, investigate and sanction torture is an obligation owed by all states (*erga omnes*), as provided by Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the related case law, Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and national constitutions and laws of the Member States; whereas specific conventions and protocols on torture and monitoring mechanisms adopted at the European and international level demonstrate the importance attached to this inviolable norm by the international community; whereas the

¹ OJ C 324, 24.12.1990, p. 201.

² OJ C 364, 18.12.2000, p. 1.

use of diplomatic assurances is incompatible with this obligation,

- H. whereas in democracies in which the respect for the rules of law is inherent, the fight against terrorism cannot be won by sacrificing or limiting the very principles that terrorism seeks to destroy, notably, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms must never be compromised; whereas terrorism can and must be fought by legal means and must be defeated while respecting international and national law,
- I. whereas it is necessary to create efficient legal instruments to combat terrorism within the framework of both international and national law,
- J. whereas the United States (US) Government's strategy to combat terrorism has made use of pervasive instruments to monitor sensitive data relating to European citizens, such as the Passenger Names Record (PNR) agreement, and to monitor bank details through the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (Swift) network,
- K. whereas this report is not intended to be an attack on the secretive nature of the secret services, but rather is intended to denounce the unlawfulness of those secret activities which, in the circumstances under investigation, led to the infringement of national and international law in the absence of appropriate democratic control,
- L. whereas on 6 September 2006, US President George W. Bush confirmed that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was operating a secret detention programme outside the United States,
- M. whereas President George W. Bush said that the vital information derived from the extraordinary rendition and secret detention programme had been shared with other countries and that the programme would continue, which raises the strong possibility that some European countries may have received, knowingly or unknowingly, information obtained under torture,
- N. whereas the Temporary Committee has obtained, from a confidential source, records of the informal transatlantic meeting of European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) foreign ministers, including US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, on 7 December 2005, confirming that Member States had knowledge of the programme of extraordinary rendition, while all official interlocutors of the Temporary Committee provided inaccurate information about this matter,
- O. whereas the Temporary Committee has obtained, from a confidential source, records of meetings of the Council's Working Party on Public International Law (COJUR) and Transatlantic Relations Working Party (COTRA) with senior representatives of the US Department of State during the first half of 2006 (notably on 8 February and 3 May 2006), while it was provided by the Council Presidency only with a summarised version of these documents; whereas the documents sent by the Council to Parliament concerning those meetings in answer to Parliament's specific request, were incomplete summaries of the proceedings with essential parts missing,
- P. whereas the fact that those meetings took place was kept from Parliament and absolute secrecy was maintained in relation to their proceedings,

- Q. whereas, in the present resolution, 'European countries' should be understood as meaning Member States and candidate and associate countries, as outlined in the mandate of the Temporary Committee adopted on 18 January 2006,
1. Recalls that terrorism represents one of the main threats to the security of the European Union and that it must be fought with lawful and coordinated efforts by all European governments, in close collaboration with international partners and notably with the United States, along the lines of the strategy defined at United Nations (UN) level; underlines that the fight against terrorism must be fought on the basis of, and in order to protect, our common values of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms; furthermore stresses that all the work carried out by the Temporary Committee is intended to make a contribution towards the development of clear and focused measures in the fight against terrorism, which are commonly accepted and respect national and international law;
 2. Considers that after 11 September 2001, the so-called 'war on terror' - in its excesses - has produced a serious and dangerous erosion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as noted by the outgoing UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan;
 3. Is convinced that the rights of the individual and full respect for human rights contribute to security; considers it necessary that in the relationship between the need for security and the rights of individuals, human rights must always be fully respected, ensuring that suspected terrorists are tried and sentenced while due process is observed;
 4. Emphasises that the positive obligation to respect, protect and promote human rights is binding, regardless of the legal status of the individual concerned, and that any discrimination among nationals of, residents in or any other person entitled to protection from, or otherwise under the jurisdiction of, the Member States must be avoided;
 5. Recalls that the purpose of this resolution, based on the report of the Temporary Committee, is to determine responsibility for the facts that it has been able to examine on the one hand and to consider ways of preventing any repetition of the abuses and violations perpetrated in connection with measures against terrorism on the other;
 6. Notes the statement made by US President George W. Bush on 6 September 2006, according to whom "a small number of suspected terrorist leaders and operatives captured during the war have been held and questioned outside the United States, in a separate programme operated by the CIA", that many of the persons who had been detained there, had subsequently been transferred to Guantánamo and that it is strongly suspected that other prisoners are still held in secret places of detention; notes the report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of 2 January 2007 mentioning 26 testimonies of mistreatment in Guantánamo since 11 September 2001;
 7. Deplores, in this context, the inability of the Council - due to the opposition of certain Member States - to adopt conclusions in response to that statement at the General Affairs and External Relations Council of 15 September 2006, and requests that the Council adopt them urgently in order to dissipate any doubt as to the Member State governments' cooperation with and connivance in the extraordinary rendition and secret prisons programme in the past, present and future;

8. Calls on the Council and the Member States to issue a clear and forceful declaration calling on the US Government to put an end to the practice of extraordinary arrests and renditions, in line with the position of Parliament;
9. Deplores the fact that the governments of European countries did not feel the need to ask the US Government for clarifications regarding the existence of secret prisons outside US territory;
10. Notes the statements by the legal adviser to the US State Department at his meeting on 3 May 2006 with representatives of the Member States meeting within the Council, according to which, in carrying out the extraordinary rendition programme, whose existence he confirmed, the sovereignty of the countries concerned had always been fully respected; notes that his remark was subsequently confirmed at his meeting with the Temporary Committee delegation which visited Washington;
11. Thanks the former CIA agents who agreed to cooperate with the Temporary Committee, particularly at certain confidential meetings at which they confirmed that the extraordinary rendition programme had already begun during the 1990s;
12. Welcomes the announcement by the new majority established by the elections to the US Senate that it will investigate the CIA's extraordinary rendition programme; notes that this is further confirmation of the relevance of the work of the Temporary Committee;
13. Denounces the lack of cooperation of many Member States, and of the Council of the European Union towards the Temporary Committee; stresses that the behaviour of Member States, and in particular the Council and its Presidencies, has fallen far below the standard that Parliament is entitled to expect;
14. Believes that the serious lack of concrete answers to the questions raised by victims, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the media and parliamentarians has only served to strengthen the validity of already well-documented allegations;
15. Stresses the serious and rigorous work undertaken by the judicial authorities of Italy, Germany and Spain and Portugal concerning the allegations that fall within the remit of the Temporary Committee, and invites the judicial authorities in other Member States to act similarly on the basis of the substantial information made available by the Temporary Committee;
16. Encourages the national parliaments of European countries to continue or launch thorough investigations, in the manner that they consider most appropriate and efficient, into these allegations, including by setting up parliamentary committees of inquiry;
17. Pays tribute to the world press, in particular the US journalists who were the first to disclose the abuses and breaches of human rights related to extraordinary rendition, thus demonstrating the great democratic tradition of the US press; also recognises the efforts and good work undertaken by several NGOs in relation to these matters, in particular Statewatch, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch;
18. Recognises that some information in the report from the Temporary Committee, including the existence of secret CIA prisons, comes from official or unofficial US sources, demonstrating the vitality and self-policing inherent in the US democracy;

19. Expresses its profound gratitude to all victims who had the courage to share their very traumatic experiences with the Temporary Committee;
20. Calls on all European countries to refrain from taking any action against officials, former officials, journalists or others who, by providing testimony or other information, either to the Temporary Committee or to other investigating bodies, have helped shed light on the system of extraordinary rendition, illegal detention and the transportation of terrorism suspects;
21. Reiterates its call on the Council, as expressed in its resolution of 6 July 2006, to adopt a common position ruling out the acceptance of mere diplomatic assurances from third countries as a basis for any legal extradition provision, where there are substantial grounds for believing that individuals would be in danger of being subjected to torture or ill-treatment;

Cooperation with EU institutions and international organisations

22. Deplores the failure by the Council and its Presidency to comply with their obligations to keep Parliament fully informed of the main aspects and basic choices of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and of work carried out in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters pursuant to Articles 21 and 39 of the Treaty on European Union;
23. Stresses, in this context, that it is wholly unacceptable that the Council should first have concealed and then, at Parliament's request, only supplied piecemeal information on the regular discussions held with senior officials of the US Government, asserting that this was the only available version; furthermore denounces the fact that the Council also referred to the request by the government of a third country that the information remain confidential;
24. Points out that these shortcomings of the Council implicate all Member State governments since they have collective responsibility as members of the Council;
25. Is outraged by the proposal which was to have been made by the then Council Presidency to set up a joint framework with the US Government on standards for the rendition of terrorism suspects, as confirmed by those who took part in the meeting of the COJUR and the COTRA with senior representatives of the US Department of State in Brussels on 3 May 2006;
26. Calls for the disclosure of the results of the discussions conducted with the United States, according to EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator Gijs de Vries, on the definitions of "rendition" and "extraordinary rendition";
27. Takes note of the fact that the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union and High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, reaffirmed that Member States must ensure that any measures they take to combat terrorism comply with their obligations under international law; expresses its concern about the omissions in the statements made to the Temporary Committee by the Council and its Secretary-General, regarding the Council's discussions and knowledge of the methods used by the United

States in its campaign against terrorism; deplores the fact that he was unable to supplement the evidence already in the possession of the Temporary Committee; asks the Council to disclose all facts and discussions about matters within the remit of the Temporary Committee and to promote a European foreign policy and an international anti-terrorism strategy that respect human rights and fundamental freedoms;

28. Questions the real substance of the post of EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator occupied by Gijs de Vries, since he was unable to give satisfactory answers to the questions raised by the Temporary Committee; is of the opinion that a revision and strengthening of his competence and power, as well as the increased transparency and monitoring of his activities by Parliament must be undertaken in the near future, so as to enhance the European dimension of the fight against terrorism;
29. Deplores the refusal by the Director of the European Police Office (Europol), Max-Peter Ratzel, to appear before the Temporary Committee, particularly because it has emerged that liaison officers, in particular for the US intelligence services, were seconded to Europol requests that the Director provide Parliament with comprehensive information concerning the role of those liaison officers, their tasks, the data to which they had access and the conditions of such access;
30. Thanks Commission Vice-President Franco Frattini for his cooperation with the work of the Temporary Committee and encourages the Commission to step up its work in the context of the continuing efforts to ascertain the truth and prevent any repetition of the facts analysed by the Temporary Committee;
31. Welcomes, in particular, the commitment shown by Vice-President Frattini to launching a Euro-Atlantic cooperation framework in the fight against international terrorism, with harmonised rules on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms;
32. Thanks Eurocontrol, and notably its Director, for its excellent cooperation and for the very useful information which it shared with the Temporary Committee;
33. Appreciates the close cooperation which the Temporary Committee has maintained with the Council of Europe, particularly its Parliamentary Assembly and Secretary-General, and encourages its Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, and its Chairman, Senator Dick Marty, to continue their work; stresses the convergence of the findings of the two committees to date; endorses the recommendations made to the Committee of Ministers by the Secretary-General, Terry Davis;
34. Expresses its deep concern about the refusals of the former and current Secretaries-General of NATO, Lord Robertson and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, to appear before the Temporary Committee or with that organisation's rejection of its request for access to the decision taken by the North Atlantic Council on 4 October 2001 concerning the implementation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty following the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001; reiterates its request to make the decision public and at least to provide information on its contents, its past and current implementation, whether it still remains into force and whether CIA flights have operated within its framework;
35. Thanks the special rapporteurs of the United Nations, Manfred Nowak (on torture) and Martin Scheinin (on the promotion and protection of human rights in connection with counter-terrorism measures) for their contributions to the work of the Temporary

Committee, while regretting that it was not possible for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, to meet the Temporary Committee; thanks the European Network of Experts on Human Rights and notably its Co-ordinator, Olivier De Schutter, for their contribution to the works of the Temporary Committee;

Information analysed by the Temporary Committee

Extraordinary rendition and the misuse of airspace and airports

36. Recalls that the programme of extraordinary rendition is an extra-judicial practice which contravenes established international human rights standards and whereby an individual suspected of involvement in terrorism is illegally abducted, arrested and/or transferred into the custody of US officials and/or transported to another country for interrogation which, in the majority of cases, involves *incommunicado* detention and torture;
37. Deplores the fact that the families of the victims are kept in complete ignorance of the fate of their relatives;
38. Underlines, notwithstanding an intended confusion created by some US representatives in private and public speeches, that extraordinary rendition is a wholly different practice from one that has been used by some European countries, in very exceptional circumstances only, namely the detention or reception into custody in third countries of individuals formally accused of very serious crimes, in order to transfer them to European soil to face criminal charges before a court with all the legal guarantees of a judicial system;
39. Condemns extraordinary rendition as an illegal instrument used by the United States in the fight against terrorism; condemns, further, the condoning and concealing of the practice, on several occasions, by the secret services and governmental authorities of certain European countries;
40. Condemns any participation in the interrogation of individuals who are victims of extraordinary rendition, because it represents a deplorable legitimisation of that type of illegal procedure, even where those participating in the interrogation do not bear direct responsibility for the kidnapping, detention, torture or ill-treatment of the victims;
41. Considers that the practice of extraordinary rendition has been shown to be counterproductive in the fight against terrorism and that extraordinary rendition in fact damages and undermines regular police and judicial procedures against terrorism suspects;
42. Stresses that at least 1 245 flights operated by the CIA flew into European airspace or stopped over at European airports between the end of 2001 and the end of 2005, to which should be added an unspecified number of military flights for the same purpose; recalls that, on one hand, there may have been more CIA flights than those confirmed by the investigations carried out by the Temporary Committee, while, on the other, not all those flights have been used for extraordinary rendition;

43. Regrets that European countries have been relinquishing their control over their airspace and airports by turning a blind eye or admitting flights operated by the CIA which, on some occasions, were being used for extraordinary rendition or the illegal transportation of detainees, and recalls their positive obligations arising out of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, as reiterated by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission);
44. Is concerned, in particular, that the blanket overflight and stopover clearances granted to CIA-operated aircraft may have been based, inter alia, on the NATO agreement on the implementation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, adopted on 4 October 2001;
45. Notes that the US Supreme Court ruling which calls for the closure of the Guantánamo prison states that the majority of detainees at the Cuban base came from Afghanistan and must therefore have transited through Europe;
46. Recalls that Article 1 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention) establishes the principle that contracting States have complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory, and accordingly does not imply any exclusion from the States' full responsibility for the observance of human rights within their territory, including the airspace above it;
47. Emphasises that the CIA has been using civil aviation rules to bypass the legal obligations for state aircraft, including those operated by the military and the police, as provided in the Chicago Convention; recalls that Article 4 of the Chicago Convention provides that: "Each contracting State agrees not to use civil aviation for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of this Convention";
48. Confirms, in view of the additional information received during the second part of the proceedings of the Temporary Committee, that it is unlikely that certain European governments were unaware of the extraordinary rendition activities taking place in their territory;
49. Stresses that the Temporary Committee's working documents Nos 7 and 8¹ provide additional information about the extraordinary renditions analysed by the committee, as well as of the companies linked to the CIA, the aircraft used by the CIA and the European countries in which CIA aircraft made stopovers;

ITALY

50. Deplores the fact that the representatives of the current and former Italian Governments who are or were responsible for the Italian secret services declined the invitation to appear before the Temporary Committee;
51. Condemns the extraordinary rendition by the CIA of the Egyptian cleric Abu Omar, who had been granted asylum in Italy and who was abducted in Milan on 17 February 2003, transferred from Milan to the NATO military base of Aviano by car, and then flown, via the NATO military base of Ramstein in Germany, to Egypt, where he was held *incommunicado* and tortured;

¹ Reference numbers: PE 380.593v04-00 and PE 380.984v02-00.

52. Condemns the active role played by a carabinieri marshal and certain officials of the Italian military security and intelligence services (SISMI) in the abduction of Abu Omar, as shown by the judicial investigation and the evidence collated by Milan's Public Prosecutor Armando Spataro;
53. Concludes, and deplores the fact, that General Nicolò Pollari, former Director of SISMI, concealed the truth while appearing before the Temporary Committee on 6 March 2006, when he stated that Italian agents had played no part in any CIA kidnapping and that SISMI was not aware of the plan to kidnap Abu Omar;
54. Considers it very likely, in view of the involvement of SISMI, that the Italian Government of the day was aware of the extraordinary rendition of Abu Omar from within its territory;
55. Thanks Public Prosecutor Spataro for his testimony to the Temporary Committee, applauds the efficient and independent investigations he carried out in order to shed light on the extraordinary rendition of Abu Omar and fully endorses his conclusions and the decision of the GUP (Giudice dell'Udienza Preliminare) to bring to judgment 26 US citizens, CIA agents, 7 senior SISMI officials, a carabiniere from Raggruppamento Operativo Speciale (ROS, Special operations group), and the assistant editor of the 'Libero' daily newspaper; welcomes the opening of the proceedings at the Milan Court;
56. Regrets that the abduction of Abu Omar jeopardised Public Prosecutor Spataro's investigation into the terrorist network to which Abu Omar was connected; recalls that had Abu Omar not been illegally seized and transported to another country, he would have faced a regular and fair trial in Italy;
57. Takes note that the testimony provided by General Pollari is inconsistent with a number of documents found on SISMI premises and confiscated by Milan prosecutors; considers that such documents show that SISMI was regularly informed by the CIA about the detention of Abu Omar in Egypt;
58. Deeply regrets that the SISMI board systematically misled, among others, Milan prosecutors, with the aim of jeopardising the investigation into the extraordinary rendition of Abu Omar; is extremely concerned about the fact that the SISMI board appeared to be working to a parallel agenda, and about the lack of appropriate internal and governmental controls; requests the Italian Government to remedy the situation urgently by establishing enhanced parliamentary and governmental controls;
59. Condemns the fact that Italian journalists investigating the extraordinary rendition of Abu Omar were illegally pursued, their telephone conversations were tapped and their computers were confiscated; stresses that testimonies from those journalists have been of the utmost benefit to the work of the Temporary Committee;
60. Criticises the length of time that it took for the Italian Government to decide to remove from office and replace General Pollari;
61. Regrets that the documents on US-Italian cooperation in the fight against terrorism, which would have assisted the investigation into the extraordinary rendition of Abu Omar, were classified by the former Italian Government and that the current government has confirmed the classified status of these documents;

62. Urges the Italian Minister of Justice to process, as soon as possible, the requests for extradition of the 26 US citizens referred to, for the purpose of standing trial in Italy;
63. Condemns the extraordinary rendition of Italian citizen Abou Elkassim Britel, who was arrested in Pakistan in March 2002 by the Pakistani police and interrogated by US and Pakistani officials, and subsequently rendered to the Moroccan authorities and imprisoned in the detention facility 'Temara', where he remains detained; emphasises that the criminal investigations in Italy against Abou Elkassim Britel were closed with no charges having been brought;
64. Regrets that, according to the documentation provided to the Temporary Committee by Abou Elkassim Britel's lawyer, the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs was in 'constant cooperation' with foreign secret services concerning the case of Abou Elkassim Britel, following his arrest in Pakistan;
65. Urges the Italian Government to take concrete steps in order to obtain the immediate release of Abou Elkassim Britel and ensure that any judicial proceedings against Abu Omar can be prosecuted in the Court of Milan;
66. Deeply regrets that Italian territory was used by the CIA to make a stopover during the flight that was used to carry out the extraordinary rendition of Maher Arar, who gave testimony to the Temporary Committee, from the United States to Syria, via Rome;
67. Notes the 46 stopovers made by CIA-operated aircraft at Italian airports and expresses serious concern about the purpose of those flights which came from or were bound for countries linked with extraordinary rendition circuits and the transfer of detainees;

THE UNITED KINGDOM

68. Welcomes the meeting in London with the UK Minister for Europe and the fact that the UK Government supplied documents and explanations; notes that the UK authorities could not answer all the questions raised by the Temporary Committee delegation to London;
69. Takes note of the declarations made by UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Margaret Beckett, in a written response to a parliamentary question whereby she admitted that the UK Government had been aware of a secret CIA prison network before US President George W. Bush acknowledged its existence in September 2006; asks the UK Government to state whether it has raised the issue with the US authorities and whether, and, if so, when, it informed or discussed the issue with other European governments;
70. Thanks the UK's All-Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Renditions (APPG), comprising members of the House of Commons and the House of Lords, for its work and for providing the Temporary Committee delegation to London with a number of highly valuable documents;
71. Condemns the extraordinary rendition of Bisher Al-Rawi, an Iraqi citizen and resident in the United Kingdom, and Jamil El-Banna, a Jordanian citizen and resident in the United Kingdom, who were arrested by Gambian authorities in Gambia in November 2002,

turned over to US agents, and flown to Afghanistan and then to Guantánamo, where they remain detained in the absence of a trial or any form of judicial assistance;

72. Points out that the telegrams from the UK security service MI5 to an unspecified foreign government, which were released to the Chairman of the APPG, Andrew Tyrie, suggest that the abduction of Bisher Al-Rawi and Jamil El-Banna was facilitated by partly erroneous information supplied by MI5;
73. Criticises the unwillingness of the UK Government to provide consular assistance to Bisher Al-Rawi and Jamil El-Banna on the grounds that they are not UK citizens;
74. Condemns the extraordinary rendition, on two occasions, of Binyam Mohammed, Ethiopian citizen and resident in the United Kingdom; points out that Binyam Mohammed has been held in at least two secret detention facilities, in addition to military prisons;
75. Is deeply disturbed by the testimony of Binyam Mohammed's lawyer, who gave an account of the most horrific torture endured by his client to the official delegation of the Temporary Committee to the United Kingdom;
76. Emphasises that the former UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Jack Straw, conceded in December 2005 that UK intelligence officials met Binyam Mohammed when he was arrested in Pakistan; points out in this respect that some of the questions put by the Moroccan officials to Binyam Mohammed appear to have been inspired by information supplied by the United Kingdom;
77. Condemns the extraordinary rendition of UK citizen Martin Mubanga, who met the official delegation of the Temporary Committee to the United Kingdom, and who was arrested in Zambia in March 2002 and subsequently flown to Guantánamo; regrets the fact that Martin Mubanga was interrogated by UK officials at Guantánamo, where he was detained and tortured for four years without trial or any form of judicial assistance and then released without charge;
78. Takes note of the testimony to the Temporary Committee by Craig Murray, former UK Ambassador to Uzbekistan, on the exchange of intelligence obtained under torture and the legal opinion of Michael Wood, former legal advisor to the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office;
79. Expresses its concern about Michael Wood's legal opinion, according to which receiving or possessing information extracted under torture, insofar as there is no direct participation in the torture, is not per se prohibited by the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1989; expresses its condemnation of any attempt to obtain information by means of torture, regardless of who is involved;
80. Notes the 170 stopovers made by CIA-operated aircraft at UK airports, and expresses serious concern about the purpose of those flights which came from or were bound for countries linked with extraordinary rendition circuits and the transfer of detainees; deplores the stopovers at UK airports of aircraft that have been shown to have been used by the CIA, on other occasions, for the extraordinary rendition of Bisher Al-Rawi, Jamil

El-Banna, Abou Elkassim Britel, Khaled El-Masri, Binyam Mohammed, Abu Omar and Maher Arar and for the expulsion of Ahmed Agiza and Mohammed El Zari;

GERMANY

81. Acknowledges the good cooperation on the part of the German Government by providing restricted documents to the Chairman and the rapporteur of the Temporary Committee; regrets, on the other hand, that no representative of the German Government was able to appear before the Temporary Committee;
82. Welcomes the excellent work of the German parliamentary inquiry committee and expresses its full support for the continuation of that committee's work;
83. Thanks Munich Public Prosecutor Martin Hofmann for his testimony to the Temporary Committee and applauds all ongoing judicial inquiries in Germany; notes and welcomes the fact that the Munich Court has issued warrants for the arrest of 13 suspected CIA agents in connection with the illegal abduction and wrongful imprisonment of Khaled el-Masri, and expects the German Government to take all necessary steps to obtain their extradition from the United States;
84. Thanks the German Parliament inquiry committee for having examined the case of Khaled El-Masri; takes note that, to date, the committee's inquiries have shown that there was no involvement of the German authorities in the illegal abduction; looks forward to the final conclusions by the German Parliament inquiry committee into this matter;
85. Condemns the extraordinary rendition of Murat Kurnaz, a Turkish citizen resident in Germany, who gave testimony to the Temporary Committee and who was arrested in Pakistan in November 2001, transferred to the US units across the border in Afghanistan by the Pakistani police on no legal basis and with no judicial assistance, and finally flown to Guantánamo at the end of January 2002, whence he was released on 24 August 2006 without charge, having been tortured in all the locations where he had been held;
86. Points out that, according to information given by Murat Kurnaz's lawyer and information provided by the German authorities, there was a prospect of the release of Murat Kurnaz from Guantánamo in 2002 but this was not accepted by the German authorities; notes that on many occasions since 2002, Murat Kurnaz's lawyer was told by the German Government that it was impossible to open negotiations with the US Government on his release because Murat Kurnaz was a Turkish citizen; notes that according to information available to the Temporary Committee as early as at the end of October 2002, Murat Kurnaz posed no terrorist threat; expects a full clarification of all relevant actions or failures to act on the part of the German authorities by the German Parliament inquiry committee and welcomes the fact that those inquiries have already begun;
87. Regrets the fact that Murat Kurnaz was interrogated twice, in 2002 and in 2004, by German officials at Guantánamo, where he was detained subject to neither a formal charge nor a trial and without judicial assistance; regrets the fact that German officials denied him any assistance and were interested only in questioning him;
88. Fully supports the investigation launched by the public prosecutor in Potsdam, transferred to the Public Prosecutor in Tübingen/Karlsruhe on 25 October 2006, into unknown perpetrators in order to establish whether Murat Kurnaz was ill-treated in Afghanistan by

German soldiers belonging to the Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK), the German army's special operational forces, before being sent to Guantánamo;

89. Notes that during his interrogation, Murat Kurnaz was confronted with details from his personal life; notes that this gives rise to the suspicion that, even before his departure from Germany, he was the subject of surveillance of a closeness which can normally be undertaken only by domestic intelligence services;
90. Appreciates the German Government's initiative in January 2006 which led to the release of Murat Kurnaz;
91. Condemns the extraordinary rendition of the German citizen Mohammed Zammar, who was arrested without formal charge on 8 December 2001 at Casablanca airport in Morocco and detained and tortured in Morocco and Syria;
92. Notes that, according to a confidential institutional source, on 26 November 2001 the German Federal Criminal Police Office provided details of Mohammed Zammar's whereabouts to the FBI, and that this facilitated Mohammed Zammar's arrest;
93. Points out that, subsequently to a meeting between the officials of the German Federal Chancellery and Syrian intelligence officials in July 2002, German prosecutors dropped charges against several Syrian citizens in Germany while the Syrian authorities allowed German officials to interrogate Mohammed Zammar in the Syrian prison Far' Falastin, which has been confirmed by a confidential institutional source; regrets that Mohammed Zammar was interrogated by German agents in that prison;
94. Calls on the German Bundestag's First Committee of Inquiry, in the context of the forthcoming expansion of its remit, to investigate the case which recently came to light involving the illegal rendition of the Egyptian citizen and long-term resident in Germany, Abdel-Halim Khafagy; Abdel-Halim Khafagy was probably arrested in Bosnia and Herzegovina in September 2001 on suspicion of being a terrorist and abducted to a prison on the US 'Eagle Base' military base in Tuzla, where he was severely mistreated and detained under inhumane conditions;
95. Is deeply concerned at information contained in an unclassified document made available to the Temporary Committee which shows that the illegal rendition of at least six Algerians from Tuzla via Incirlik to Guantánamo was planned at the US European Command (USEUCOM) military base near Stuttgart; calls on the German Bundestag to investigate without delay whether those alleged renditions involved breaches of the Forces Status Agreement or other agreements or treaties concluded with US military forces on German territory, whether further illegal renditions were planned by USEUCOM and whether German liaison officers were involved in any way;
96. Notes the 336 stopovers made by CIA-operated aircraft at German airports and expresses serious concern about the purpose of those flights which came from or were bound for countries linked with extraordinary rendition circuits and the transfer of detainees; deplores the stopovers in Germany of aircraft that have been shown to have been used by the CIA, on other occasions, for the extraordinary renditions of Bisher Al-Rawi, Jamil El-Banna, Abou Elkassim Britel, Khaled El-Masri, Binyam Mohammed, Abu Omar and Maher Arar and for the expulsion of Ahmed Agiza and Mohammed El Zari; is

particularly concerned that one of the flights referred to was destined for Guantánamo; strongly encourages the German authorities further to investigate that flight;

97. Notes the allegations concerning the temporary detention and mistreatment of suspected terrorists at the US military prison in Mannheim-Blumenau, welcomes the investigations opened by the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office and hopes that the German Bundestag and/or the competent committee of inquiry will investigate this case more closely;

SWEDEN

98. Takes note of the position of the Swedish Government, expressed in the letter transmitted to the Temporary Committee by its Foreign Minister Carl Bildt; regrets that no representative of the government was able to appear before the Temporary Committee in order to hold an exchange of views on its position;
99. Condemns the fact that Sweden's expulsion in December 2001 of Mohammed El-Zari and Ahmed Agiza, Egyptian citizens who were seeking asylum in Sweden, was based on diplomatic assurances from the Egyptian Government alone, which did not provide effective safeguards against torture; also acknowledges that the Swedish Government hindered the men from exercising their rights in accordance with the provisions of the ECHR, by not informing their lawyers until they had arrived in Cairo; deplores the fact that the Swedish authorities accepted an US offer to place at their disposal an aircraft that benefited from special overflight authorisation in order to transport the two men to Egypt;
100. Deplores the fact that the Swedish security police lost control over the enforcement of the expulsion of Ahmed Agiza and Mohammed El-Zari to Egypt, outside the rule of law, by remaining passive during the degrading treatment of the men by US agents at Bromma airport;
101. Underlines that the decision to expel the men was taken at the highest executive level, from which no appeal was possible;
102. Fully endorses the UN Human Rights Committee's decision of 6 November 2006 in which it found that Sweden had breached the absolute ban on torture; similarly endorses a separate ruling by the UN Committee against Torture of 20 May 2005, which concluded that Sweden had violated the UN Convention against Torture and stated that "procurement of diplomatic assurances (from Egypt), which, moreover, provided no mechanism for their enforcement, did not suffice to protect against this manifest risk";
103. Thanks the Swedish Chief Parliamentary Ombudsman, Mats Melin, for his testimony to the Temporary Committee and applauds his investigation which concluded that the Swedish security service and airport police "were remarkably submissive to the American officials" and "lost control of the enforcement", resulting in the ill-treatment of Ahmed Agiza and Mohammed El-Zari, including physical abuse and other humiliation, at the airport immediately before they were transported to Cairo;

AUSTRIA

104. Notes the written explanations given on behalf of the Austrian Government but regrets that the Austrian Government did not consider it appropriate to appear before the Temporary Committee in order to hold an exchange of views about its position;
105. Notes that, according to these written explanations, the men referred to in the paragraphs that follow, Masaad Omer Behari and Gamal Menshawi, were resident in Austria, did not have Austrian citizenship, and their freedom of movement was unrestricted; notes that the two men left Austria voluntarily and without undergoing checks by the Austrian authorities, and that they were arrested by foreign agencies, outside Austrian territory and outside the area of influence of the Austrian authorities, with no Austrian involvement; notes that, accordingly, these are clearly not cases of rendition of persons to foreign authorities;
106. Recalls, nonetheless, that under the ECHR, State parties have jurisdiction as concerns residents within their territory, and, consequently, a duty to protect them and to inquire into any human rights violations against them;
107. Condemns the fact that Masaad Omer Behari, a Sudanese citizen and resident in Austria since 1989, who gave testimony to the Temporary Committee, was abducted at Amman airport on 12 January 2003 on his way back to Vienna from Sudan;
108. Deplores the fact that Masaad Omer Behari was later illegally secretly detained in a prison close to Amman run by the Jordan General Intelligence Department, in the absence of a trial or legal assistance, and that he was tortured and ill-treated there until 8 April 2003, when he was released without charge;
109. Condemns the abduction of Egyptian citizen and resident in Austria, Gamal Menshawi, who was arrested on his way to Mecca at Amman airport in February 2003, and later brought to Egypt where he was secretly detained until 2005 in the absence of a trial or legal assistance;
110. Regrets that, having considered the above paragraphs, neither a special nor a parliamentary inquiry was undertaken in Austria into the possible involvement of the Austrian authorities in the two cases referred to; urges the Austrian Parliament to start appropriate inquiries as soon as possible;

SPAIN

111. Welcomes the declaration of good cooperation with the Temporary Committee of the Spanish Government, in particular, the testimony given to the Temporary Committee by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; regrets, nevertheless, that the Spanish Government ultimately did not authorise the Director of the Spanish Intelligence Services to appear before the Temporary Committee, several months after having been requested to do so;
112. Thanks the Chief Prosecutor Javier Zaragoza and Prosecutor Vicente González Mota of the Audiencia Nacional for their testimony to the Temporary Committee and applauds their investigations into the use of Spanish airports for the transit of CIA aircraft within the context of the programme of extraordinary rendition; encourages the prosecutors to investigate further the stopovers of the aircraft involved in the extraordinary rendition of

Khaled El-Masri; takes note of the decision by the Spanish authorities, at the request of the Judge of the Audiencia Nacional, to declassify secret documents held by the intelligence services concerning the use by CIA-operated aircraft of Spanish airports;

113. Applauds the investigative journalism of Diario de Mallorca, which played an important role in revealing the transit of CIA aircrafts through the Balearic Island airports and the identification of their crews;
114. Recalls the words of Chief Prosecutor Zaragoza that "there was no obstacle, objection or trouble from the side of the Spanish Government in the investigations by the Audiencia Nacional";
115. Calls on the Spanish authorities to take all necessary steps to allow Spanish citizen Mustafa Setmariam Nasarwho, abducted in Syria in October 2005 and rendered to US agents, to face a fair trial before competent judicial authorities;
116. Notes the 68 stopovers made by CIA-operated aircraft at Spanish airports and expresses serious concern about the purpose of those flights which came from or were bound for countries linked with extraordinary rendition circuits and the transfer of detainees; deplores the stopovers in Spain of aircraft that have been shown to have been used by the CIA in other countries for the extraordinary rendition of Ahmed Agiza, Mohammed El-Zari, Bisher Al-Rawi, Jamil El-Banna, Abou Elkassim Britel, Khaled El-Masri, Binyam Mohammed, Abu Omar and Maher Arar, according to the legal investigations under way in Spain and Italy; is particularly concerned that, of the above flights, three originated from or were destined for Guantánamo; strongly encourages the Spanish prosecutors further to investigate those flights;

PORTUGAL

117. Welcomes the meeting in Lisbon with the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs and the fact that the Portuguese Government supplied documents and explanations; regrets that the Portuguese authorities could not answer all the questions raised by the Temporary Committee delegation to Portugal;
118. Welcomes the judicial inquiry into the possible use of Portuguese territory for the transfer of prisoners suspected of terrorism and subjected to torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, opened on 5 February 2007, by the competent authorities in Portugal;
119. Notes, in particular, the case of Abdurahman Khadr, allegedly carried on board the Gulfstream IV N85VM from Guantánamo to Tuzla in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 November 2003, with a stopover at a Portuguese airport on 7 November 2003; calls on the authorities to examine other possible cases of detained people transported via Portugal;
120. Welcomes the establishment of the inter-ministerial working group on 26 September 2006 and the entry into force, on 13 October 2006, of a regulation stipulating that lists of the names of crew members and passengers on private flights must be submitted to the Portuguese frontier authorities;

121. Notes the 91 stopovers at Portuguese airports and expresses serious concern about the purpose of those flights that came from or were bound for countries linked with extraordinary rendition circuits and the transfer of detainees; is particularly concerned that of those flights, at least three originated from or were destined for Guantánamo; notes that the aircraft involved in the rendition of Maher Arar and Abou Elkassim Britel made stopovers in Portugal on their return flights;
122. Expresses concern at an additional list that the Temporary Committee has obtained, which indicates that civil and military aircraft from a number of countries, travelling to or from Guantánamo in Portuguese airspace, between 11 January 2002 and 24 June 2006, made a further 14 stopovers at Portuguese airports; notes that the Portuguese Government provided information concerning 7 of those stopovers, carried out within the framework of operation "Enduring Freedom";

IRELAND

123. Welcomes the testimony given to the Temporary Committee by the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of the Irish Government as well as his unequivocal criticism of the process of extraordinary rendition; notes the fact, however, that he failed to answer all the questions in relation to the concerns that Irish airports may have been used by CIA aircraft travelling to or from extraordinary rendition missions (as in the case of Abu Omar);
124. Thanks the Irish Human Rights Commission (IHRC) for its testimony to the Temporary Committee and endorses its view which considers that the acceptance by the Irish Government of diplomatic assurances does not fulfil Ireland's human rights obligations, which oblige the government actively to seek to prevent any actions that could in any way facilitate torture or ill-treatment in Ireland or abroad; regrets the decision of the Irish Government not to follow the IHRC's advice in this matter to date; notes that there is a continuing dialogue between the IHRC and the Irish Government;
125. Notes the 147 stopovers made by CIA-operated aircraft at Irish airports and expresses serious concern about the purpose of those flights which came from or were bound for countries linked with extraordinary rendition circuits and the transfer of detainees; deplores the stopovers in Ireland of aircraft that have been shown to have been used by the CIA, on other occasions, for the extraordinary rendition of Bisher Al-Rawi, Jamil El-Banna, Abou Elkassim Britel, Khaled El-Masri, Binyam Mohammed, Abu Omar and Maher Arar and for the expulsion of Ahmed Agiza and Mohammed El Zari;
126. Notes the absence of Irish parliamentary scrutiny of either Irish or foreign intelligence services and the potential that this creates for abuse;
127. Considers, that, in the absence of a system of random searches, a ban should be imposed on all CIA-operated aircraft landing in Ireland;
128. Urges the Irish Government, in view of the findings of the Temporary Committee, to agree to launch a parliamentary inquiry into the use of Irish territory as part of the CIA rendition circuit;

GREECE

129. Notes the 64 stopovers made by CIA-operated aircraft at Greek airports and expresses serious concern about the purpose of those flights which came from or were bound for countries linked with extraordinary rendition circuits and the transfer of detainees; deplores the stopovers in Greece of aircraft that have been shown to have been used by the CIA, on other occasions, for the extraordinary rendition of Bisher Al-Rawi, Jamil El-Banna, Abou Elkassim Britel, Khaled El-Masri, Binyam Mohammed and Maher Arar and for the expulsion of Ahmed Agiza and Mohammed El-Zari;

CYPRUS

130. Notes the 57 stopovers made by CIA-operated aircraft at Cypriot airports and expresses serious concern about the purpose of those flights which came from or were bound for countries linked with extraordinary rendition circuits and the transfer of detainees; deplores the stopovers in Cyprus of aircraft that have been shown to have been used by the CIA, on other occasions, for the extraordinary rendition of Bisher Al-Rawi, Jamil El-Banna, Abou Elkassim Britel, Khaled El-Masri, Binyam Mohammed and Abu Omar and for the expulsion of Ahmed Agiza and Mohammed El-Zari;

DENMARK

131. Welcomes the cooperation received from the Danish authorities, while regretting that no representative of the government considered it appropriate to appear before the Temporary Committee;

BELGIUM

132. Calls on the Belgian Government to disclose the results of all investigations that have taken place concerning the use of Belgian airports and Belgian airspace by aircraft involved in the extraordinary rendition programme or the transport of detainees;
133. Notes the statements of the President of the Belgian Senate Anne-Marie Lizin which deplore the lack of cooperation by the Belgian intelligence services and the Belgian authorities at the beginning of the inquiry; but refers to the final conclusions of the report of the Belgian Senate, which testify to Belgium's willingness to overcome the problems encountered;

TURKEY

134. Expresses its serious concern about the failure of the Turkish authorities to extend diplomatic protection to Turkish citizen Murat Kurnaz and about the absence of any step to secure his release from the prison at Guantánamo;
135. Regrets that, on the contrary, the same authorities used the illegal detention of Murat Kurnaz to interrogate him at Guantánamo;
136. Deplores the silence of the Turkish authorities concerning the use of their territory for the stopover of an aircraft that had taken to Guantánamo the six citizens of or residents in Bosnia and Herzegovina, of Algerian origin, who were illegally arrested in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

137. Emphasises that a delegation of the Temporary Committee was received in Skopje in April 2006 by the President of the Republic, members of the government and several officials and thanks them for the welcome given to the delegation; notes, however, a lack of thorough investigation into the Khaled El-Masri case by the authorities of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;
138. Condemns the extraordinary rendition of the German citizen Khaled El-Masri, abducted at the border-crossing Tabanovce in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 31 December 2003, illegally held in Skopje from 31 December 2003 to 23 January 2004 and then transported to Afghanistan on 23 to 24 January 2004, where he was held until May 2004 and subjected to degrading and inhuman treatment;
139. Urges the Council and its High Representative for the CFSP to shed full light on the fact that the EU police mission (PROXIMA) was incorporated into the Ministry of Interior of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and was involved in the work of the Macedonian Security and Counter-Espionage Service (DBK) at the time when Khaled El-Masri was handed over to the CIA; would like to know if it is true that the Council questioned the EU staff involved in the PROXIMA mission so as to evaluate the level of information in their possession regarding the case of Khaled el Masri; if appropriate, asks the Council to provide Parliament with a full account of the investigation;
140. Fully endorses the preliminary findings of Munich Public Prosecutor Martin Hofmann that there is no evidence on the basis of which to refute Khaled El-Masri's version of events;
141. Deeply regrets the fact that the authorities of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia failed to follow up the recommendations made by the Temporary Committee in its interim report of 6 July 2006;
142. Points out again that the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia authorities are expected to carry out investigations; urges the newly elected national parliament of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to set up a committee of inquiry as soon as possible to deal with the case of Khaled El-Masri and to cooperate fully with the ongoing inquiry of the German Parliament;

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

143. Welcomes the fact that the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the only European government that does not deny its participation in the extraordinary rendition of four citizens of and two residents in Bosnia and Herzegovina, all of Algerian origin, and stresses that the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the only European government to have accepted formal responsibility for its illegal actions; regrets, however, that the steps undertaken by the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina have not yet resulted in the release of the six men from Guantánamo;
144. Condemns the extraordinary rendition of those six men, who were abducted in Sarajevo on 17 January 2002, turned over to US soldiers and then flown to Guantánamo, where they remain detained without trial or legal guarantees;

145. Takes note of the testimony given to the Temporary Committee by Wolfgang Petritsch, former High Representative of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and by Michèle Picard, former President of the Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which stated that representatives of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina were given adequate notice of the imminent transfer of the men to the US forces before events unfolded; condemns in this respect the governments of the Member States for their lack of action;
146. Regrets the fact that the international community, as represented in Bosnia and Herzegovina, turned a blind eye to the failure to implement the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina ordering the release of the six men from custody;
147. Points out that, according to the information that the Temporary Committee received from the lawyers of the six men, the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina were subject to unprecedented pressure from the US Government, which threatened to close its embassy, withdraw all staff and cease diplomatic relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina unless the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately arrested the six men on terrorism charges;
148. Notes that Wolfgang Petritsch confirmed that the United States put considerable pressure on the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the international community not to interfere in the renditions and that the commander of the international NATO-led Stabilisation Force in particular rejected any questioning of his activities since he acted in his capacity as US military officer;

OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

149. Notes the stopovers made by CIA-operated aircraft at other European countries' airports and expresses serious concern about the purpose of those flights which came from or were bound for countries linked with extraordinary rendition circuits and the transfer of detainees; encourages the authorities of those European countries to launch adequate investigations into this matter;

Secret detention facilities

150. Welcomes the investigations carried out into the existence of secret detention facilities in Europe by Human Rights Watch, the Washington Post and American Broadcasting Company News (ABC News);
151. Recalls that some journalists at the Washington Post and ABC News, as they confirmed to the Temporary Committee, were put under pressure not to name the eastern European countries, namely Poland and Romania, where there were said to have been secret detention facilities;
152. Emphasises that the concept of "secret detention facility" includes not only prisons, but also all places where persons are held *incommunicado*, such as private apartments, police stations or hotel rooms, as in the case of Khaled El-Masri in Skopje;
153. Is deeply concerned that in some cases temporary secret detention facilities in European countries may have been located at US military bases;

154. Calls for the appropriate implementation of bilateral agreements, Status of Forces Agreements and military base agreements (between Member States and third countries) to ensure the monitoring of respect for human rights and, where appropriate, for a review and renegotiation of those agreements to this effect; stresses that, according to the Venice Commission, the legal framework of foreign military bases on the territory of Council of Europe's Member States must enable them to exercise sufficient powers to fulfil their human rights obligations;
155. Points out in this regard the allegations concerning the US Coleman Barracks in Mannheim, Germany, and calls on both the judiciary and the German Bundestag's inquiry Committee to investigate this case further;
156. Regrets that there may have been a lack of control over US military bases by host European countries; recalls, however, that the ECHR provides that all State parties are bound to exercise jurisdiction over their entire territory, including any foreign military bases;
157. Recalls that the ECHR also provides that every case of detention must be lawful and must be the result of proceedings prescribed by law, whether national or international;
158. Recalls that imposing or executing or allowing directly or indirectly secret and illegal detentions, which are instruments resulting in people's 'disappearance', constitute serious violations of human rights per se and that the active or passive involvement in such secret and illegal detentions by a European country renders that country responsible under the ECHR;

ROMANIA

159. Welcomes the excellent hospitality and good cooperation extended by the Romanian authorities to the Temporary Committee, including meetings with members of the Romanian Government, as well as the establishment of an ad hoc inquiry committee of the Romanian Senate;
160. Notes, however, the reluctance on the part of the competent Romanian authorities to investigate thoroughly the existence of secret detention facilities on its territory;
161. Regrets that the report issued by the Romanian inquiry committee was entirely secret except for its conclusions, included in Chapter 7, categorically denying the possibility that secret detention facilities could be hosted on Romanian soil; regrets that the Romanian inquiry committee heard no testimony from journalists, NGOs, or officials working at airports, and has not yet provided the Temporary Committee with the report contrary to its commitment to do so; regrets that taking these elements into consideration, the conclusions drawn in the Romanian inquiry committee's report appear premature and superficial; takes note, however, of the intention expressed by the Chairwoman of the inquiry committee to the Temporary Committee delegation to consider the conclusions provisional;
162. Regrets the lack of control of the Gulfstream aircraft with Registration Number N478GS that suffered an accident on 6 December 2004 when landing in Bucharest; recalls that the aircraft took off from Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, and that its seven passengers

disappeared following the accident; appreciates, however, the good cooperation of the Romanian authorities in handing over the accident report to the Temporary Committee;

163. Is deeply concerned to see that the Romanian authorities did not initiate an official investigation process into the case of a passenger on the aircraft Gulfstream N478GS, who was found carrying a Beretta 9 mm Parabellum pistol with ammunition;
164. Notes the 21 stopovers made by CIA-operated aircraft at Romanian airports, and expresses serious concern about the purpose of those flights which came from or were bound for countries linked with extraordinary rendition circuits and the transfer of detainees; deplores the stopovers in Romania of aircraft that have been shown to have been used by the CIA, on other occasions, for the extraordinary rendition of Bisher Al-Rawi, Jamil El-Banna, Abou Elkassim Britel, Khaled El-Masri, Binyam Mohammed and Abu Omar and for the expulsion of Ahmed Agiza and Mohammed El Zari; is particularly concerned that, of the flights referred to, two originated from or were destined for Guantánamo; strongly encourages the Romanian authorities further to investigate those flights;
165. Is concerned about the doubts expressed in regard to the control exercised by the Romanian authorities over US activities at Kogalniceanu airport;
166. Cannot exclude, based only on the statements made by Romanian authorities to the Temporary Committee delegation to Romania, the possibility that US secret services operated in Romania on a clandestine basis and that no definitive evidence has been provided to contradict any of the allegations concerning the running of a secret detention facility on Romanian soil;

POLAND

167. Deplores the glaring lack of cooperation by the Polish Government with the Temporary Committee, in particular when receiving the Temporary Committee delegation at an inappropriate level; deeply regrets that all those representatives of the Polish Government and Parliament who were invited to do so, declined to meet the Temporary Committee;
168. Believes that this attitude reflects an overall rejection on the part of the Polish Government of the Temporary Committee and its objective to examine allegations and establish facts;
169. Regrets that no special inquiry committee has been established and that the Polish Parliament has conducted no independent investigation;
170. Recalls that on 21 December 2005, the Special Services Committee held a private meeting with the Minister Coordinator of Special Services and the heads of both intelligence services; emphasises that the meeting was conducted speedily and in secret, in the absence of any hearing or testimony and subject to no scrutiny; stresses that such an investigation cannot be defined as independent and regrets that the committee released no documentation, save for a single final statement in this regard;
171. Notes the 11 stopovers made by CIA-operated aircraft at Polish airports and expresses serious concern about the purpose of those flights which came from or were bound for countries linked with extraordinary rendition circuits and the transfer of detainees;

deplores the stopovers in Poland of aircraft that have been shown to have been used by the CIA, on other occasions, for the extraordinary rendition of Bisher Al-Rawi, Jamil El-Banna, Abou Elkassim Britel, Khaled El-Masri and Binyam Mohammed and for the expulsion of Ahmed Agiza and Mohammed El Zar;

172. Regrets that following the hearings carried out by the Temporary Committee delegation in Poland, there was confusion and contradictory statements were made about the flight plans for those CIA flights, which were first said not to have been retained, then said probably to have been archived at the airport, and finally claimed to have been sent by the Polish Government to the Council of Europe; acknowledges that in November 2006, the Szymany Airport's management provided the Temporary Committee with partial information on flight plans;
173. Thanks the former manager of the Szymany airport, for the valuable testimony given before the Temporary Committee; notes the fact that during 2006 he or she was questioned in the framework of a late enquiry concerning the CIA flights, immediately after his or her testimony was made public;
174. Takes note that, according to different sources, several high-value detainees who had been held secretly in Afghanistan in 2003 were transferred out of the country in September and October 2003; underlines with concern that a Boeing 737 with Registration Number N313P, used by the CIA for ascertained renditions, flew from Kabul to Szymany airport on 22 September 2003 and was then directed to Guantánamo;
175. Recalls that as regards the landing of the aircraft referred to at Szymany airport, seven staff on board were joined by five passengers and no customs control was carried out on those passengers;
176. Takes note of the declarations made by Szymany airport employees, and notably by its former manager, according to which:
 - in 2002, two Gulfstream jets, and in 2003, four Gulfstream jets with civilian registration numbers were parked at the edge of the airport and did not enter customs clearance;
 - orders were given directly by the regional border guards about the arrivals of the aircraft referred to, emphasising that the airport authorities should not approach the aircraft and that military staff and services alone were to handle those aircraft and to complete the technical arrangements only after the landing;
 - according to a former senior official of the airport, no Polish civilian or military staff were permitted to approach the aircraft;
 - excessive landing fees were paid in cash - usually between EUR 2 000 and EUR 4 000;
 - one or two vehicles waited for the arrival of the aircraft;
 - the vehicles had military registration numbers starting with “H”, which are associated with the intelligence training base in nearby Stare Kiejkuty;

- in one case, a medical emergency vehicle belonging to either the police academy or the military base was involved;
 - one airport staff member reported following the vehicles on one occasion and seeing them heading towards the intelligence training centre at Stare Kiejkut;
177. Acknowledges that shortly thereafter and in accordance with President George W. Bush's statements on 6 September 2006, a list of the 14 detainees who had been transferred from a secret detention facility to Guantánamo was published; notes that 7 of the 14 detainees had been referred to in a report by ABC News, which was published 9 months previously on 5 December 2005 but withdrawn shortly thereafter from ABC's webpage, listing the names of twelve top Al Qaeda suspects held in Poland;
 178. Encourages the Polish Parliament to establish a proper inquiry committee, independent of the government and capable of carrying out serious and thorough investigations;
 179. Regrets that Polish human rights NGOs and investigative journalists have faced a lack of cooperation from the government and refusals to divulge information;
 180. Takes note of the statements made by the highest representatives of the Polish authorities that no secret detention centres were based in Poland; considers, however, that in the light of the above circumstantial evidence, it is not possible to acknowledge or deny that secret detention centres were based in Poland;
 181. Notes with concern that the official reply of 10 March 2006 from Under-Secretary of State Witold Waszykowski to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, Terry Davis, indicates the existence of secret cooperation agreements, initialled by the two countries' secret services themselves, which exclude the activities of foreign secret services from the jurisdiction of Polish judicial bodies;

KOSOVO (UNDER UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1244(1999))

182. Expresses deep concern about the fact that the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) obtained access to NATO-run detention facilities in Kosovo only in July 2006;
183. Regrets the refusal of NATO to provide evidence of the allegations of illegal detention of terrorist suspects in the prison run by the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR) at Camp Bondsteel, the only detention facility in Europe where CPT inspectors were not allowed unlimited access until very recently;
184. Points out in this respect that the testimony given to the Temporary Committee by the former Kosovo Ombudsman, Marek Antoni Nowicki, confirmed that from July 1999, inmates were frequently detained at Camp Bondsteel, subject only to a decision by the Commander of KFOR and subject to no judicial decision or any form of other external control; recalls that from 2000 to 2001, a number of people were detained also following administrative decisions of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and that, according to official data available, 23 people were imprisoned at Camp Bondsteel for a short period of time by the KFOR Commander in connection with violent events in Kosovo in spring 2004;

Other relevant information collected by the Temporary Committee

185. Points out that the Temporary Committee came across information - including the direct testimony of Murat Kurnaz - about the interrogation of Guantánamo detainees carried out by agents of Member State governments; emphasises that those interrogations were aimed at collecting information from individuals illegally detained, which is clearly in contradiction with the public condemnation of Guantánamo, as expressed on several occasions at both EU and Member State level;
186. Encourages the Member States involved to launch adequate investigations into this matter;

Recommendations

Political recommendations

187. Considers it necessary that those European countries that have started inquiries and investigations at governmental, parliamentary and/or judicial level on matters within the remit of the Temporary Committee should conduct their work as speedily as possible and make public the results of the investigations;
188. Urges European countries in relation to which serious allegations have been made regarding active or passive cooperation with extraordinary rendition and that have not undertaken governmental, parliamentary and/or judicial investigations to commence such proceedings as soon as possible; recalls that, according to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, there is a positive obligation on Member States to investigate allegations of and sanction human rights violations in breach of the ECHR;
189. Calls for the closure of Guantánamo and for European countries immediately to seek the return of their citizens and residents who are being held illegally by US authorities;
190. Considers that all European countries that have not done so should initiate independent investigations into all stopovers made by civilian aircraft carried out by the CIA, at least since 2001, including those cases already analysed by the Temporary Committee;
191. Expects to be kept fully informed about all developments concerning all the above-mentioned procedures;
192. Calls on European countries to compensate the innocent victims of extraordinary rendition and to ensure that they have access to effective and speedy compensation, including access to rehabilitation programmes, guarantees that there will be no repetition of what happened as well as appropriate financial compensation;
193. Asks the Commission to undertake an evaluation of all anti-terrorist legislation in the Member States and of both formal and informal arrangements between Member State and third-country intelligence services, from a human rights perspective, to review legislation which international or European human rights bodies consider could lead to a breach of human rights and to present proposals for actions in order to avoid any repetition of the matters under the remit of the Temporary Committee;

194. Considers it necessary to review by limiting and restrictively defining the exceptions that flow from the notion of 'State secret', also in the framework of the impending review of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001¹, as well as the adoption of common principles by the EU institutions as regards the treatment of confidential information, to avoid abuses and deviations that are more and more unacceptable in modern democratic States and that contradict human rights obligations; deems it necessary to establish specific mechanisms to allow for access to secret information by parliaments and judges, as well as for the release of the information after a certain period of time;
195. Notes the recent creation of a High-Level Working Group composed of representatives of the Commission, the Council and US governmental representatives of the Justice Ministry and the Homeland Security, which constitutes the political framework for EU-US dialogue on security matters, including differences in the approach to terrorism as well as the concerns raised by the Temporary Committee; deems it necessary to associate in this High-Level Working Group the European Parliament and the US Congress, as well as to publish its agendas, minutes, documents examined and decisions taken, in order to ensure and increase its democratic legitimacy and transparency;
196. Encourages European countries when they conduct military operations in third countries to:
 - ensure that any detention centre established by their military forces is subject to political and judicial supervision and that *incommunicado* detention is not permitted;
 - take active steps to prevent any other authority from operating detention centres which are not subject to political and judicial oversight or where *incommunicado* detention is permitted;

Legal recommendations

197. Considers that the powers of Parliament's temporary inquiry committees should be reinforced and the inter-institutional decision governing the exercise of Parliament's right of inquiry be amended accordingly;
198. Considers that Parliament should be adequately involved when the Community or the Union adopt measures affecting civil rights and liberties;
199. Calls for the establishment of an adequate and structured system of cooperation between Parliament and competent bodies of the United Nations and the Council of Europe when dealing with matters related to internal security of the European Union;
200. Calls for enhanced cooperation with national parliaments in order to share all information in the public domain related to the fight against international terrorism;
201. Underlines the importance of a common definition of 'terrorism' and calls for the establishment of efficient legal tools for combating terrorism within the framework of

¹ Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43).

international law; believes that the United Nations is the most suitable organisation to define the concept;

SECRET SERVICES

202. Fully endorses the conclusions of the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, Terry Davis, about the lack of oversight and judicial control mechanisms in respect of security services, as expressed in the "Follow-up to the Secretary General's reports under Article 52 ECHR" and expects his recommendations to be duly taken into consideration; calls on Member States to provide adequate and effective parliamentary monitoring (by establishing oversight committees with appropriate powers to access documents and budgetary information) and legal supervision over their secret and intelligence services and the formal and informal networks of which they are part;
203. Considers it necessary to enhance the Conference of the Oversight Committees on the Intelligence bodies of the Member States, in which Parliament should be fully involved;
204. Considers that all European countries should have specific national laws to regulate and monitor the activities of third countries' secret services on their national territories, to ensure better monitoring and supervision also of their activities, as well as to sanction illegal acts or activities, in particular those in violation of human rights;
205. Considers the reinforcement of cooperation between the secret and security services of Member States to be highly desirable, either on a multilateral basis, preferably within an EU framework, or on a bilateral basis, provided that a legal framework for it is created ensuring full democratic parliamentary and judicial control and human rights are respected and protected at all times;
206. Urges the Council and the Member States to establish as a matter of priority a system for the democratic monitoring and control over the joint and coordinated intelligence activities at EU level; proposes an important role for Parliament in this monitoring and control system;

AIR TRAFFIC

207. Urges the Member States to ensure that Article 3 of the Chicago Convention, which excludes state aircraft from the scope of the Convention, is properly implemented in order that all military and/or police aircraft fly over or land on another State's territory only if they have prior authorisation and, in accordance with that Convention, that a ban or system of inspections be introduced for all CIA-operated aircraft known or suspected to have been involved in extraordinary rendition;
208. Calls on Member States to take adequate measures to ensure that overflight clearances for military and/or police aircraft should be granted only if accompanied by guarantees that human rights will be respected and monitored;
209. Considers it necessary to enforce effectively, both at EU and national level, the Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft so that the exercise of jurisdiction is used to ensure the observance of any obligation under a multilateral international agreement, in particular concerning the protection of human rights, and that, when appropriate, inspections on board should be undertaken;

210. Calls on the Commission to adopt adequate legislative proposals on transport safety, as provided for in Article 71 EC Treaty, taking into account the recommendations included in this resolution;
211. Recalls the Community competence in the field of transport, and notably transport security; asks the Commission, therefore, to take immediate action to ensure that the recommendations made by the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe as well as by Parliament are implemented;
212. Calls on the Commission to consider adopting rules on the use, monitoring and management of European airspace, on the use of EU airports and on the monitoring of non-commercial aviation;

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND AGREEMENTS

213. Urges the Member States that have not yet done so to complete as soon as possible ratification of the 2003 EU-US Extradition Agreement, while taking adequate steps to avoid wrongly interpreting Article 12 of the Agreement, thereby ensuring that its scope does not extend beyond formal extradition and does not legitimise extraordinary renditions;
214. Calls on European countries to ratify and implement the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons Against Enforced Disappearance, adopted on 20 December 2006 by the UN General Assembly;
215. Believes that, in providing for the adequate interpretation and enforcement of the UN Convention Against Torture, all European countries should ensure that their definition of torture is in accordance with Article 1 of the Convention and that, moreover, the obligations relating to the prohibition of torture are also fulfilled with respect to other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment referred to in Article 16 of the Convention; considers that all European countries should ensure that Article 3 of the Convention is properly enforced, in particular in relation to the activities of their secret services;
216. States that, given that the protection against *refoulement* is higher under the ECHR than under the UN Convention against Torture, European countries should ensure in any event the protection afforded by the ECHR; recalls, in this context, that the principle of *non-refoulement* is also recognised by the Court of Justice of the European Communities;
217. Calls on all European countries to sign and ratify the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture and establish independent national mechanisms to monitor places of detention; emphasises the need to ensure that all such procedures used by the different international conventions on human rights are compatible;
218. Takes the view that the CPT should be granted access without delay or obstruction to any place of detention within the European countries, including foreign military bases, and provided with all relevant information concerning such detention, and that, to this end, any bilateral agreements that restrict the access of the CPT should be revised;
219. Urges all European countries to comply with the provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;

220. Believes that the European Union should encourage all third countries to become party to the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and to the UN Convention on Enforced Disappearances;
221. Asks European countries to establish clear rules that provide for the possibility of State immunity being waived where illegal actions violate human rights;

Administrative recommendations (at EU level)

222. Takes the view that all internal services within the Council (inter alia, the Policy Unit and the Joint Situation Centre) and the Commission (the Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention Unit in the Directorate-General for External Relations and relevant services in the Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security), should be strengthened in the framework of the implementation of the EU Security Strategy and the counter-terrorism strategy in close cooperation with all Member States, and that their cooperation with each other, as well as with Member States, be clearly regulated and data protection be ensured; considers that Parliament should be involved fully in this regard by granting it oversight powers similar to those of national parliamentary oversight committees, and that the Court of Justice be granted competence in this area; underlines that the competence of the EU in the field of combating terrorism should be significantly strengthened;

EU relations with third countries

223. Urges the European Union to stress in its contacts with third countries that the appropriate legal framework for governing the international fight against terrorism is criminal law and international human rights law;
224. Stresses the necessity of political dialogue with the United States, as well as with other strategic partners of the European Union, on security matters in order to combat terrorism effectively and by legal means;
225. Calls on the European Union to recall that the full application of the 'democratic clause' is fundamental in its relations with third countries, especially those with which it has concluded agreements; calls on the governments of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Morocco to provide clarity on their role in the extraordinary renditions programme;
226. Strongly believes that it is necessary to promote within the UN framework codes of conduct for all security and military services based on respect for human rights, humanitarian law and democratic political control, similar to the 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe;

Final conclusions

227. Stresses, in view of the powers it was provided with and of the time which it had at its disposal, [and the secret nature of the investigated actions, that the Temporary Committee was not put in a position fully to investigate all the cases of abuses and violations falling within its remit and that its conclusions are therefore not exhaustive;

228. Recalls the principles and values on which the European Union is based, as provided in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union, and calls on the EU institutions to meet their responsibilities in relation to Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union and all other relevant provisions of the Treaties, and to take all appropriate measures in the light of the conclusions of the work of the Temporary Committee, the facts revealed in the course of the Temporary Committee's investigation and any other facts that may emerge in the future; expects the Council to put pressure on all the governments concerned to give full and through information to the Council and the Commission and, where necessary to start hearings and commission an independent investigation without delay;
229. Believes that the principle of loyal cooperation enshrined in the Treaties – which requires Member States and the EU institutions to take measures to ensure the fulfilment of their obligations under the Treaties, such as the respect of human rights, or resulting from action taken by the EU institutions, such as ascertaining the truth about alleged CIA flights and prisons, and to facilitate the achievement of EU tasks and objectives – has not been respected;
230. Recalls that in light of European Court of Human Rights case law, a signatory State bears responsibility for the material breach of the provisions of the ECHR, and therefore also of Article 6 of the Treaty on the European Union, not only if its direct responsibility can be established beyond reasonable doubt, but also by failing to comply with its positive obligation to conduct an independent and impartial investigation into reasonable allegations of such violations;
231. Notes the reports by reputable media operators that extraordinary rendition, illegal detention, and systematic torture involving many people is continuing, and considering the declaration by the current US Government that the use of extraordinary rendition and secret places of detention will be continued; therefore calls for an EU-US counter-terrorism summit to seek an end to such inhumane and illegal practices, and to insist that cooperation with regard to counter-terrorism is consistent with international human rights and anti-torture treaty obligations;
232. Instructs its Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, where necessary in cooperation with the Committee on Foreign Affairs, notably its Sub-Committee on Human Rights, to follow up politically the proceedings of the Temporary Committee and to monitor the developments, and in particular, in the event that no appropriate action has been taken by the Council and/or the Commission, to determine whether there is a clear risk of a serious breach of the principles and values on which the European Union is based, and to recommend to it any resolution, taking as a basis Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty on European Union, which may prove necessary in this context;
233. Calls on its Secretary-General to publish, at least in compliance with Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, all the documents received, produced and examined, as well as the records of the proceedings of the Temporary Committee on the Internet as well as in any other appropriate manner and calls on the Secretary-General to ensure that the developments in fields falling within the remit of the Temporary Committee after its disbandment are monitored;

234. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the candidate countries and the associated countries, and to the Council of Europe, NATO, the United Nations and the government and both Houses of Congress of the United States, and to request them to keep Parliament informed of any development that may take place in the fields falling in the remit of the Temporary Committee.